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AVOIDING BLURRED LINES: THE
COMPUTATION OF DAMAGES IN RULE
10B-5 SECURITIES CLASS ACTION
LAWSUITS IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT




When plaintiffs bring a federal class action lawsuit against one or more
defendants for violations of Rule 1Ob-5 of the Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934 ("Rule 1Ob-5"), one of the most difficult issues that arises is the
damages prove-up.' This certainly presented a challenge in the 2004
. B.A., University of Wisconsin-Madison; J.D., UCLA School of Law, Order of the Coif.
Mr. Goldman is currently a litigation associate in the Los Angeles office of Milbank,
Tweed, Hadley & McCloy.
1. Enacted in 1948, and amended in 1951, Rule lOb-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
a. To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
b. To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
c. To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
15 U.S.C. §78j(b) (2005).
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Northern District of California case of In re Clarent Corp. ,2 the third-ever
Rule lOb-5 securities class action to go to verdict since the enactment of
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (the "PSLRA").
3
Although litigants can spend thousands of dollars on highly qualified
experts to prove damages, the fact remains that the computation of
damages is rarely more than an optimistic estimate based on vague,
complex, and difficult-to-ascertain factors. Given that PSLRA made it
more difficult to plead Rule 1Ob-5-related fraud than before, it may strike
attorneys as odd that the legislature has not correspondingly made it more
difficult for "professional plaintiffs" to present difficult-to-understand
damages estimates to the jury.4 Furthermore, given that the trend seems to
be that more and more Rule lOb-5 cases will be brought in this era of
2. No. C-01-3361 CRB (N.D. Cal.).
3. The author wishes to note that was he was on the litigation team that represented the
defendant in In re Clarent See. Litig. (though the case went through to verdict, it was settled
prior to the damages phase). Along the way, the difficulty of establishing damages was but
one of the fascinating areas of undeveloped law that demonstrated a need for attention in the
academic world. This is probably due to the fact that so few claims go to trial; "it has been
estimated that more than 80% of all class action securities law claims are settled, between
10% and 20% are dismissed by the court and far less than 1% go to trial." Paul W. Boltz,
Jack C. Auspitz & Charles C. Comey, Securities Class Action Litigation in the U.S.: What
Asian Issuers Need to Know, (2004), http://library.findlaw.com/2004/Aug/23/133555.html.
It should also be noted that this article, for the most part, discusses the assessment of
damages in securities class action cases where there has only been one actionable
misstatement by a Defendant. The author recognizes that in many class action securities
cases, plaintiffs will have alleged several misstatements over numerous financial quarters -
often with a differing number of misstatements for each quarter. While I have tried my best
to keep this article's analysis at a basic level, the fact that plaintiffs often allege several
misstatements over several quarters simply lends credence to this paper's thesis, which is
that it is extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible, to accurately assess damages in class
action securities cases.
4. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 §27(a)(3)(B)(vi), 15 U.S.C. §
77z-l(a)(3)(B)(vi) (2005) (restricting "professional plaintiffs" by limiting lead plaintiffs in
securities class actions to one who has served as a "lead plaintiff, or an officer, director, or
fiduciary of a lead plaintiff, in no more than 5 securities class actions brought as plaintiff
class actions pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure during any 3-year period");
Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) ("In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting
fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other
condition of mind of a person may be averred generally"). See also Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2005) (generally requiring a plaintiff to
specifically plead each alleged misrepresentation or nondisclosure and why it is misleading,
and mandating specific allegations of facts as to any disclosure deficiency supporting a




corporate scandal, securities litigators must familiarize themselves with all
undeveloped aspects of related law.
This paper first gives a brief explanation of Rule lOb-5. Then, the
paper explains both how damages are determined by Ninth Circuit federal
courts in Rule lOb-5 actions, and certain corresponding admissibility
standards that must be met in an expert's report valuating damages in Rule
1Ob-5 cases. Then, given the premise that one cannot prove, with requisite
certainty, the damages suffered by a class when a defendant violates Rule
1 Ob-5, this paper argues for the establishment of statutory fines as damages,
as opposed to requiring the defendant to pay the amount of money lost due
to his, her, or its fraudulent activities.
II. RULE 1OB-5's ELEMENTS
Under Rule 1 Ob-5, private litigants have an "implied remedy" by which
they can sue "primary violators" of the federal securities laws.5 Although
this article presupposes a general basic knowledge of Rule 1Ob-5, the basic
elements of such a claim are described in this section.
First, there must be the employment of deceptive devices or
contrivances by a defendant seeking to commit fraud with respect to the
sale or purchase of securities.6 Second, a plaintiff must be either a
purchaser or seller of securities.7 Third, the plaintiff must prove that the
defendant engaged in "manipulation" or "deception," and not just breach of
fiduciary duty. 8 Fourth, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant's
misstatement or nondisclosure is material. 9 Fifth, the defendant must act
with scienter, meaning knowing or intentional misconduct.10 Sixth, the
defendant must prove that he relied on the alleged representation after
exercising due diligence, and establish causation between the defendant's
wrongful conduct and the plaintiffs loss by virtue of purchasing or selling
5. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983).
6. Loveridge v. Dreagoux, 678 F.2d 870, 874 (10th Cir. 1982).
7. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1977); McGann v. Ernst &
Young, 102 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996).
8. See, Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
9. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988) (quoting TSC Industries, Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) and stating that "[t]here must be a substantial
likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable
investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made available.").
10. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
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a security.1'1 Indeed, a plaintiff can only have standing if the plaintiff has
purchased or sold securities.12  Seventh, when liability is based upon
silence, the alleged violator must have had a duty to disclose the withheld
information. 13 Eighth, and as with almost any cause of action, the plaintiff
must prove the extent of the damages suffered.
Although several topics arise surrounding these basic elements, this
paper focuses on the extraordinarily difficult nature of computing damages
suffered by a large class of shareholders over an extended time period.
III. PLAINTIFFS IN A CLASS ACTION SUIT FOR VIOLATION OF RULE 101B-5
CAN RECOVER ACTUAL, OUT-OF-POCKET DAMAGES, AND IN CERTAIN
CIRCUMSTANCES CAN RECOVER CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
In actions for a violation of Rule 1Ob-5, Plaintiffs are limited in their
potential recovery to actual, out-of-pocket damages, as "no person
permitted to maintain a suit for damages under the provisions of [the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934] shall recover, through satisfaction of
judgment in one or more actions, a total amount in excess of his actual
damages on account of the act complained of.' 4 Consequently, Plaintiffs
in this action can only receive actual, out-of-pocket damages pursuant to
statute. 15
11. Levinson, 485 U.S. at 224. See also Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(b),
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2005) (providing that plaintiff must prove loss causation in any private
action arising under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934); C. Edward Fletcher, The "In
Connection With " Requirement of Rule JOb-5, 16 PEPP. L. REv. 913 (1989).
12. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 733-61.
13. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
14. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §28(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (2004).
15. In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 829 F. Supp. 1176, 1181 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Arrington v.
Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 651 F.2d 615, 621 (9th Cir. 1981)). See also
Affiliated Ute Citizens of the State of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 154-55 (1972)
(holding that damages in a securities fraud case are measured by the difference between the
price at which a stock sold and the price at which the stock would have sold absent the
alleged misrepresentations or omissions); Ambassador Hotel Co., Ltd. v. Wei-Chuan Inc.,
189 F.3d 1017, 1030 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the usual measure of damages for Rule
lOb-5 violations is out-of-pocket loss, which is the difference between the values of what
the plaintiff gave up and the value of what the plaintiff received); DCD Programs, Ltd. v.
Leighton, 90 F.3d 1442, 1447 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that compensatory damages in




Actual damages are the plaintiffs' loss as represented by the decline in
stock value attributable to alleged Rule lOb-5 violations. 16 Where a class
seeks to establish damages by reference to the market price of a security,
the award of damages to the plaintiff shall not exceed the difference
between the purchase or sale price paid or received, as appropriate, by the
plaintiff for the subject security and the mean trading price of that security
during the 90-day period beginning on the date on which the information
correcting the misstatement or omission that is the basis for the action is
disseminated to the market.'
7
Also, the plaintiffs may be able to receive "consequential damages that
can be proven with reasonable certainty to have resulted from the fraud."'1
8
IV. DETERMINING ACTUAL DAMAGES IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT THROUGH
THE "PRICE LINE" AND "VALUE LINE" METHOD SET FORTH IN
GREEN V. OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORP.
It is important for both litigants and their attorneys in the Ninth Circuit
to have a firm grasp as to how damages will be estimated in Rule lOb-5
cases, as well as in related securities actions. Otherwise, the opposition's
expert cannot be adequately cross-examined, and the jury will likely be left
with two disparate damages estimations, both created by typically well-
credentialed and credible experts. Furthermore, given the large number of
technology companies in California that went bankrupt following the dot-
com bust, resulting in a high likelihood of shareholder-instigated securities
class action lawsuits, Ninth Circuit attorneys have a high professional
impetus to know about damages estimations in such cases. Not only is
such knowledge important at trial, but given that the vast majority of these
claims are dismissed or settled, attorneys need to know the true value of a
claim.19
16. In re Seagate Tech. II Sec. Litig., 843 F. Supp. 1341, 1347-50 (9th Cir. 1994); see
also In re Oracle, 829 F. Supp. at 1181 (adopting the "efficient capital market hypothesis,"
and holding that damages must account for all factors affecting a stock's price because a
"security's value does not fluctuate with reported earnings, but varies instead with the
discounted value of future cash flows which are expected to accrue to the security. For a
variety of reasons, these may not reflect reported earnings.")
17. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §21D(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e) (2004).
18. DCD Programs, Ltd., 90 F.3d at 1447 (quoting Volk v. D.A. Davidson & Co., 816
F.2d 1406, 1413 (9th Cir. 1987)).
19. Again, as noted in Part I, supra, the 2004 case of In re Clarent Corp. was only the
third case to go through trial to verdict since 1995, despite the fact that thousands of
securities class actions have been filed since 1995.
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Actual damages for a violation of Rule 1 Ob-5 must be reduced by the
"portion of the [stock's] price decline that is the result of forces unrelated
to the wrong. Such forces can be broadly categorized into: (1) company
risk-the unique risk that is peculiar to the particular stock at issue, and (2)
market risk-the risk associated with market wide variations generally.,
20
Judge Sneed, in Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., assumed that where
the fraud-on-the-market is one involving either a false positive statement
or a failure to disclose a negative fact, the price of the security will remain
at a level above its unbiased value until a full corrective disclosure is
issued. Accordingly, Judge Sneed put forth the concepts of a 'price line'
and a 'value line,' in order to trace the degree of price inflation at various
points in time.
21
By determining the "price line" and the "value line," an expert can then
determine the stock price's inflation due to fraud at any given period.
A. "PRICE LINE" AND "VALUE LINE"
"The price line is relatively easy to obtain, as it is merely a plot, over
time, of the various prices at which trades in the security occurred. ' 2 2 On
the other hand, the "value line," or the value of the stock absent fraud, must
be determined despite the fact that it is nearly impossible to correctly
ascertain with any degree of certainty.23 In the Ninth Circuit, this
determination must be made by an expert who completes an "event study,"
or similar analysis. 24 "An event study is a statistical regression analysis
that examines the effect of an event on a dependant variable, such as a
corporation's stock price. '25 In conducting an event study, the expert must
remember that
[p]laintiffs are entitled to compensation only for the 'residual' price effect
attributable to the fraud .... [T]he effects of at least three major factors
that influence stock price must be identified and removed: (i) economy-
20. In re Executive Telecard, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 979 F. Supp. 1021, 1025 (1997) (citing
Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1342 (9th Cir. 1976)).
21. Green, 541 F.2d at 1341 (Sneed, J., concurring).
22. In re Seagate Tech. II Sec. Litig, 843 F. Supp. 1341, 1347-48 (9th Cir. 1994).
23. Id. at 1347-48; In re Imperial Credit Indus. Inc. Sec. Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 1005,
1014 (C.D. Cal. 2003) ("[A] proper measure of damages in the securities context ...
requires elimination of that portion which is unrelated to the alleged wrong.") (internal
citations omitted).
24. In re Imperial Credit Indus. Inc. Sec. Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d at 1014 (holding that an
event study must account for both affirmative misstatements and material omissions as




wide information; (ii) industry information; and (iii) firm-specific
information not related to the fraud.
' 26
1. Economy-Wide and Industry-Specific Information
To determine the amount of a stock's decline in value attributable to
economy-wide or industry-pertinent factors, an expert must analyze the
overall conditions in the securities market.27  "Overall securities market
conditions are often eliminated by using a broad-based standard market
index such as the Standard & Poor's 500 stock index or the Wilshire 5000
index."
28
Furthermore, any decline in the price of a defendant company's stock
may be caused by industry-specific economic conditions.2 9 Consequently,
"it is necessary to eliminate these economic factors through the use of
industry indices[, which] reflect the price behavior of similar types of
securities issued by publicly traded companies." 30  Since most companies
do not fall within one single industry category, an expert usually needs to
specially construct industry indices.
37
2. Company-Specific, Non-Fraudulent Factors
The event study must also account for non-fraudulent, company
specific factors.32 An expert completes an event study by
compiling the daily returns for a period not affected by the alleged fraud
and then, using a regression model, calculating correlation coefficients or
betas for each index. These coefficients are used with the index values for
26. Jon Koslow, Note, Estimating Aggregate Damages in Class-Action Litigation Under
Rule 10b-5 for Purposes of Settlement, 59 FORDHAM L. REv. 811, 819 (1991).





32. Id.; see discussion infra Section V for standards that an expert must adhere to when
determining the company-specific, non-fraud related influences on the decline in a stock's
value. Additionally, it should be noted that an "event study" carries with it the problem of
predicting "returns on trading days affected by fraud disclosures, even though significant
non-fraud company information may also be revealed on these days. Performing a micro-
analysis of trading patterns to try to correlate abrupt and abnormal price movements with a
carefully prepared timeline of public information releases may provide a partial solution."
Koslow, supra note 26, at 825.
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the period of the fraud to determine the unexplained random error term or
portion of price behavior that cannot be explained by the market or
industry indices. An analysis of these residual or unexplained price
changes is undertaken to determine which of these might be explained by
the influence of firm-specific, but non-fraud related, information, and
which might be attributed to the fraud alleged. By separating out the
fraud-related component of a security's price behavior in this fashion, it is
possible to obtain the price profile the security likely would have
exhibited had there been no fraud. This, by definition, is the "value line"
Judge Sneed envisioned.33
B. USING THE PRICE LINE AND VALUE LINE TO ASSESS DAMAGES
In summary, the "price line" reflects the amounts of money at which
the stock traded, and the "value line" reflects the value of the security
absent the fraud.34  Once the "price line" and "value line" have been
obtained and compared to each other, "[t]he difference between the two
values represents the effect of the fraud, and thus the estimated damages,
during the [class period].
' 35
Clearly, however, the determination of the value line can never be an
exact science. After all, the aforementioned market, industry, and
33. Koslow, supra note 26, at 825.
34. Id. at 819.
35. Id. But see In re Executive Telecard, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 979 F. Supp. 1021, 1024-29
(S.D.N.Y 1977). In that case from the Southern District of New York, the expert calculated
damages by comparing a defendant company's "actual historical stock price during the
Class Period, to ... the stock's 'true value."' Id. at 1024. The "true value" was determined
by looking to the price at which the stock traded during a ten day period "following the
publication of a Barron's article, which discussed the facts underlying [the company's]
misstatements and omissions, including the class action complaint's allegation that [the
company] had been overstating income." Id. The expert chose this period because "in the
absence of other influences, the price of a fraudulently inflated security and its 'true' value
should converge on or shortly after the date the fraud or misrepresentation was disclosed."
Id.; see also Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 (1988) (endorsing the "efficient
market hypothesis"). The average difference between the historical price and true value was
then "adjusted... to reflect a decline in the Standard & Poor's Long Distance Telephone
Index." Id. Finally, the expert put the resulting number into a proprietary computerized
model that reflected "adjustments for such factors as inflation, float, volume, intra day
trading and short interest" to determine the damages. Id. The Court held the expert's
damages valuation unreliable because he failed to conduct an event study that would reduce
the damages due to company-specific non-fraud related factors, and he failed to compare the
defendant company's stock to the stock of companies of similar volatility. Id. at 1024-27.
Nevertheless, the Court indicates that such a damages valuation could be held reliable if it
had accounted for the aforementioned factors. Id. at 1028-29.
[Vol. 2:1
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company-specific factors elucidated by federal courts all have the potential
to affect one another in an infinite number of ways. Such limitless
potential scenarios make it nearly impossible to be certain that one has
correctly estimated damages in a Rule lOb-5 case. Nevertheless, the
federal courts have devised various formulas for ascertaining a plaintiffs
damages, depending on the nature of the individual plaintiffs purchase or
sale of stock.
1. Stocks Bought During Claim Period, One or No Stocks Sold During
Claim Period
Green sets forth a method of calculating an individual plaintiffs
damages where the plaintiff purchases stock in the class period and sells at
least one share of stock within the class period, as represented by the
following mathematical form:
D = P * (PLp - VLp) - S * (PLs - VLs), where D represents damages to
the individual; P represents the number of securities purchased in the class
period; PLp represents the price read from the price line at the time of
purchase; VLp represents the value taken from the value line at the time
of purchase; S represents the number of securities sold in the period, with
the added condition that the maximum value of S is equal to P; PLs and
VLs represent, respectively, the amounts taken from the price line and
value line at the point of sale. In this formula, the first product [P * (PLp -
VLp) ] represents the loss to the plaintiff caused by the fraudulent price
inflation--i.e., the "extra" amount plaintiff was forced to pay in purchasing
his securities. The second product [S * (PLs - VLs) ], on the other hand,
represents the amount by which plaintiff benefited from the fraud if and
when he sold his shares.
3 6
2. Stocks Purchased During Claim Period, Yet Never Sold
However, a plaintiff may be a "retention plaintiff," which refers to a
plaintiff who pays "an inflated price for the securities at the date of
purchase[,] . . . never sells any securities[,] . . . [and] never benefits from
the fraudulently inflated price in any manner., 37 Such a plaintiff's damages
would be "the difference, at the time of purchase, between the price line
and the value line, multiplied by the number of securities bought., 38 With
36. In re Seagate Tech. II Sec. Litig., 843 F. Supp. 1341, 1348-49 (9th Cir. 1994).
37. Id. at 1349.
38. Id.
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reference to the above equation, the last term (S * PLs - VLs) would drop
out, because S would equal zero; the plaintiffs damages could be
determined with the equation: D = P * (PLp - VLp).
39
3. Plaintiff both Bought and Sold Stock During Class Period
Yet another type of plaintiff both purchases and sells a company's
securities at the inflated price-such investors are colloquially known as
the "ins and outs. ' 40 Unlike the aforementioned plaintiffs, this plaintiff is
harmed by purchasing the stock at an inflated price, yet he also recoups
some, if not all, of his investment upon resale at the inflated price.4' Thus,
this plaintiffs damages must be deducted by the amount of money
recouped upon resale.42
Where the plaintiff resells all of his securities during the class period,
with reference to the above formulas, P = S. The formula for determining
this plaintiffs damages becomes: D = P * (PLp - VLp) - (PLs - VLs).43
4. Plaintiff Bought Stock During Class Period, Sold Some Stock During
Class Period, and Retained Some Stock Until After the Fraud Was
Revealed
A situation may arise where a Plaintiff purchased stock at an inflated
price during the class period, sold some of that stock at an inflated price
during the class period, yet retained some stock until after the company's
fraud is revealed (and, thus, after the stock price drops).44 In these cases,
assuming the number of shares purchased is greater than the number of
shares sold, "the existence and amount of damages will depend on the
relative magnitudes of the purchases, sales, and amounts of fraudulent price







44. Id. at 1350.
45. Id. It is possible that, in circumstances where the amount of money recouped by the
plaintiff by selling an inflated stock at an inflated price within the class period may offset
the money the plaintiff loses by failing to sell stock prior to the disclosure of the company's
fraud and the subsequent drop in the shares' value. Id. at 1350, fn. 9. Cases have not
addressed the propriety of such an offset. Id.
[Vol. 2:1
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5. Aggregate Damages in Class Actions
To calculate aggregate class damages, the
[n]umber of securities purchased must be determined. This can be done in
either of two ways: (1) collecting proofs of claims by persons trading in
the security during the class period; or (2) estimating the volume of
trading by using aggregate trading data. Method (1) can be costly and
time consuming, while (2) requires use of assumptions that may not be
correct. Because of the cost factor, estimation is usually employed.
Estimating the number of shares which trade and thus are affected by the
fraud-on-the-market is a complex endeavor, primarily because of
intermediate trading (between broker-dealers) and the unavailability of
trading records for all class members.46
V. MANDATORY STANDARDS FOR ADMISSIBILITY OF AN EXPERT'S
REPORT - CREATING THE VALUE DAMAGES
Before admitting expert testimony into evidence, the trial judge is
charged with the gatekeeping obligation of ensuring that the testimony is
both relevant and reliable.4 7 This gatekeeping obligation applies to all
expert testimony, including testimony based on technical and other
specialized knowledge. 48 The trier of fact is not bound by the opinion of
any expert witness and will accept or reject expert testimony, in whole or in
part, in the exercise of sound judgment.49
Although the standard governing the admissibility of expert testimony
elucidated in Daubert was apparently limited to experts giving "scientific
* . . knowledge" testimony, Daubert's general instruction still holds true:
"[t]he focus [of the admissibility of Expert Witness' testimony under
Federal Rule of Evidence 702], of course, must be solely on principles and
methodology, not on the conclusions that they create." 50 Consequently, to
ensure that the proper principles and methodology have been employed in
an expert's study, the federal courts demand that certain procedural steps
occur. These steps include the use of an event study to determine the effect
46. Id. at 1349, fn. 8 (citing Koslow, supra note 26, at 841).
47. Kumho Tire, LTD. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999); Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993).
48. Kumho Tire, LTD., 526 U.S. at 141; see FED. R. EviD. 702.
49. Lukens v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 945 F.2d 92, 96 (5th Cir. 1991) (internal
citations omitted).
50. In re Executive Telecard, LTD. Sec. Litig., 979 F. Supp. 1021, 1024 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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of market and non-fraud related company-specific events on the defendant
company's stock, and a comparison in the decline of a defendant
company's stock with the stock of companies that are comparably volatile.
A. VALUE LINE AND EVENT STUDY
Determining the "value line" in a damages valuation requires an in-
depth evaluation of statistical evidence. 5' Typically, an expert completes
this evaluation; this is the situation in the case sub judice.52 However, an
expert must arrive at his or her determination as to a given stock's "value
line" by methods that satisfy Federal Rule of Evidence 702. .
1. The Event Study Must Analyze Non-Fraud Related, Company Specific
Activities That Affect the Stock's Value
Importantly, "[d]ecoding how much of the price behavior of a security
is attributable to alleged market manipulation requires statistical
analysis., 54 "Use of an event study or similar analysis is necessary... to
isolate the influences of information specific to [a defendant company]." 55
Additionally, the event study must involve more than tracking price
behavior of the price index that encompasses a defendant company's
field.56  For example, the In re Executive Telecard court rejected an
expert's damages analysis used in Winkler v. NRD Mining Ltd., in which an
expert witness testified that all he did was "track[] the price behavior of an
index of mining stocks during the class period, and used that information to
remove the effect of general market forces from the price changes in NRD
stock., 57 The In re Executive Telecard court held such an event study to be
unsatisfactory, as the "proper methodology for eliminating that portion of
51. Koslow, supra note 26, at 819.
52. Id.
53. FED. R. EVID. 702 ("If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified
as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise.").
54. In re Seagate Tech. II Sec. Litig., 843 F. Supp. 1341, 1348 (9th Cir. 1994).
55. In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 829 F. Supp. 1176, 1181 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (citing Koslow,
supra note 26, at 822.); see also In re Executive Telecard, 979 F. Supp. at 1025 (holding
that merely reading press releases side-by-side with a stock's daily price history does not
suffice as an "event study," because it fails to consider the effect of company-specific
events, such as a spinoff of a company's division to another country, on the company's
stock).




the price decline that is the result of forces unrelated to the wrong [] should
include elimination of both general market factors and company specific-
factors.58
2. When the Expert Witness Analyzes the Defendant Company's Stock
Against an Industry Price Index, the Defendant Company's Stock Must
Hold a Meaningful Correlation to That Price Index
When the expert compares a company's stock to the stock of other
companies in the same industry by using a price index, that price index
must have a meaningful and precise correlation with the company's stock
price.59 If the expert fails to value the stock against a precisely correlated
index, the amount of a company's stock's decline in value attributable to
market conditions potentially will be undervalued because the less-volatile
companies in the index will likely suffer less of a decrease in stock value
than may be felt by a highly volatile defendant company.6 ° Consequently,
if the plaintiffs improperly choose a price index, the plaintiffs risk failing to
decrease the damages claim by the higher amount of stock depreciation
attributable to external market conditions specific to a highly volatile
industry.
B. ESTIMATING CLASS DAMAGES
As stated above, the damages determination in a 1Ob-5 class action
often involves estimation because of the difficulty in determining the
number of shares traded during the class period.61 In the settlement
context, the court "does not require aggregate damages to be determined
with mathematical precision." 62 However, the court must be satisfied that
the expert used sound methodology in determining damages.63 For
example, an expert cannot use a "proportional decay" model that
58. Id. (emphasis added).
59. Id. at 1027, fn. 3 (holding that a "small-cap" stock company specializing in tele-
communications that moves in accordance with the market's expectations and perceptions
of its long term economic prospects should not be valued against a portfolio of securities
that includes highly capitalized companies that trade on reported earnings per share).
60. Id.
61. In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 829 F. Supp. 1176, 1181 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
62. Id. at 1182.
63.Id.
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assume[s] that all investors are equally likely to trade, so that a
'proportional' number of shares are assumed to come from shareholders
who are long-term holders and from those who are 'in-and-out' traders.
[This is because] a share traded may have a much greater than
proportional probability of being re-traded during the Class Period due to
the disproportionate influence on trading of short-term traders,
arbitrageurs, and similar market participants. Failure to weight the
likelihood of trading to reflect the characteristics of trading peculiar to [a
defendant corporation] would likely result in a serious overestimation of
aggregate damages. 64
VI. A SHIFT FROM AWARDING DAMAGES TO STATUTORY FINES
One would not be shocked if the reader of this article, having made it
thus far, has suffered a severe nose-bleed. Not only does the computation
of damages in class action securities litigation involve improbably complex
formulas that no lay juror would understand, there does not seem to be any
way to independently verify whether one side's expert is simply "pulling
the wool" over everybody's eyes. Thus, although an expert could probably
prove to a jury that some damages occurred, it is not likely that the exact
damages to be awarded to the plaintiff class can be established by a
preponderance of the evidence. Given that the enactment of the PSLRA
was meant to thwart "professional plaintiffs" and other abusive practices in
private security class actions, a proposal that augments the damages
requirement would be in keeping with this goal because it would make it
harder for "professional plaintiffs" to blind the jury with arcane and
complex formulas in order to convince them that an overestimated damages
award is appropriate.
65
A. PROPOSAL FOR A COURT-APPOINTED EXPERT
To alleviate this problem, the legislature should mandate that the court
appoint an expert, with the losing party ultimately paying the expert's
fees.66 This will prevent a "battle of the experts," which in this
64. Id. (emphasis added).
65. See, e.g., Donald Langevoort, The Reform of Joint and Several Liability Under the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Proportionate Liability, Contribution
Rights and Settlement Effects, 51 Bus. LAW 1157 (1996).
66. See Fed. R. Evid. 706 (allowing for court-appointed experts). Additionally, several
states have provisions for the court-appointment of experts to investigate, report, or testify.
See, e.g., Cal. Evid. Code § 730
(When it appears to the court, at any time before or during trial of an action, that
expert evidence is or may be required by the court or by any part to the action, the
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complicated arena has the potential to result in two diametrically opposite
opinions from well-credentialed experts being presented to a jury of lay
people. Having an objective, neutral expert from whom each side can
adduce facts pertaining to damages will thus reduce the ability of
"professional plaintiffs" to blind the jury with a flurry of numbers and
complex theories. Litigators for both sides would be allowed to examine
the expert on the stand in order to determine the basis for the expert's
opinion, as litigators currently can do with experts, but the existence of a
neutral expert would nonetheless reduce bias and increase jurors' faith in
the accuracy of the neutral expert's estimate.
Moreover, as trials can be bifurcated into liability and damages phases,
the expert would not even take the stand unless and until there was a
finding of liability by the fact-finder. Once, and if, liability has been
established, the expert can take the stand for additional examination. Thus,
if the fact-finder decides that a defendant is not liable for violating Rule
lOb-5, the court's time will not have to be taken up by the expert's
testimony and the fact-finder will not have been needlessly confused.
B. PROPOSAL FOR THE INSTITUTION OF FINES DISBURSED TO PLAINTIFF
CLASS
Additionally, the legislature should eliminate the need to determine
damages via the methods discussed in Part IV of this paper. Frankly, it is
impossible to prove, with requisite certainty, how market forces, fraud, and
non-fraud related company-specific factors interact to affect a stock's price.
Rather, it should simply be enough to establish the other elements of a Rule
1 Ob-5 case, and leave it to the jury to determine (a) whether any damages
occurred, and (b) the relative range of damages caused by the defendants'
bad acts. This will retain the need for an expert to establish damages in
general terms that a jury is more capable of comprehending. Further, the
fines can be distributed amongst the class based upon the number of shares
held by each party. For example, the fine can be distributed, pro rata, to
each class member based upon the amount of shares held by the class
court on its own motion or on motion of any party may appoint one or more
experts to investigate, to render a report as may be ordered by the court, and to
testify as an expert at the trial .... The court may fix compensation for these
services .... "); Cal. Evid. Code § 731 (providing that, in civil actions, "the
compensation fixed under Section 730 shall, in the first instance, be apportioned
and charged to the several parties in such proportion as the court may determine
and may thereafter be taxed and allowed in like manner as other costs.).
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member following the disclosure of the fraud. Alternatively, the court-
appointed expert could create a neutral value line and price line, as
described above, which the class members can utilize to calculate their
individual damages. When the damages for all of the class members are
aggregated, the individual shareholder's damages will correspond to a
given percentage of the aggregate damages, which will be the percentage of
the fine that the class member receives.
The level of fines would be predicated (a) on the general amount of
loss that the experts can prove was caused by the defendant's fraud, and (b)
the average number of shares issued during the time period that the fraud
was on-going. Further, the fines would be rather substantial, so as to deter
companies from committing fraud. To set forth the levels of such fines
would be an endeavor beyond my expertise. Suffice it to say, those with
the requisite knowledge should be able to determine the levels of fines.
Some may complain that enacting such a proposal will cause
shareholders to recover less than the amount of money that they lost due to
the defendant's fraud. Indeed, absent use of a price-line/value-line model,
those shareholders who both invest and sell their shares before evidence of
a Rule 1 Ob-5 violation arises may, quite simply, be unable to recoup losses
potentially attributable to fraud; this does not seem completely unpalatable,
since those investors will have already recouped a portion of their losses,
and it seems insurmountably difficult to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that undisclosed fraud caused any loss at all in the value of one's
shares. Given the nature of the securities market, however, investors must
be mindful of the saying, caveat emptor. In other words, those
shareholders who invest enough money in a public company to be
significantly affected by a market fraud-created decline in stock price-
those investors for whom a fraud-related decrease in stock value causes
losses significant enough to justify the time and energy of a lawsuit-must
bear the risk that the people running that company may commit fraud.
They can research the company, diversify their securities portfolio, or take
any other steps to avoid significant loss when a company, for example,
misstates its yearly earnings. In any event, these people would at least
receive a portion of the fine levied upon a liable defendant (and if the fines
are high enough, then the recovery may significantly offset the investor's
loss).67
67. Moreover, bear in mind that the damages will typically be reduced in securities fraud
class actions to account for attorneys' costs, expenses, and fees. Thus, even in the current




Despite the inherent difficulty in determining damages in a Rule 1 Ob-5
claim, this article sets forth a primer on understanding exactly what an
expert must do to establish damages. By proving both the "price line" and
the "value line," an expert can set forth his or her explanation of how
market factors, fraud, and non-fraud related company-specific factors
impact a stock's price on a day-by-day basis. Practical understanding of
this concept by a jury, however, is not going to be likely. Furthermore, the
necessary uncertainty in aggregating class damages makes it impossible to
establish an essential element of the Rule 1Ob-5 claim: damages. Thus, the
federal legislature should enact a new statute that creates a fine to be paid
by the violating defendant to the class, as opposed to an inexact amount of
damages. While the plaintiff class's expert would still need to prove the
existence of damages by a preponderance of the evidence, the need to show
exact damages would disappear. This would punish the defendant and
compensate the plaintiff class, which ostensibly took the market risk that
their stock's value would plummet due to any number of reasons, including
fraud.
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